A Framework for Interest Awards in International Arbitration by M. Alexis Maniatis et al.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 41, Issue 4 2018 Article 3
2017 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
CONFERENCE ISSUE
A Framework for Interest Awards in
International Arbitration
M. Alexis Maniatis∗ Florin Dorobantu†
Fabricio Nunez‡
∗
†
‡
Copyright c©2018 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
 821 
ARTICLE 
A FRAMEWORK FOR INTEREST AWARDS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
M. Alexis Maniatis,* Florin Dorobantu** and Fabricio Nunez*** 
ABSTRACT 
Issues of pre-award and post-award interest are an important 
component of quantum awards that typically receive little attention. 
While there is a set of alternatives that are commonly advocated, 
there is not an agreement on a systematic approach for determining 
the correct interest rate. In this Article, we argue that economic 
principles can be used to develop a framework for guiding tribunals. 
This framework proposes economically appropriate alternatives 
based on the  tribunal’s interpretation of the contract, treaty, or law 
at issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions surrounding interest rates arise in most cases where 
damages are awarded. International arbitration tribunals typically 
calculate damages based on when the incident occurred, and then add 
“pre-award” and “post-award” interest. The interest rate applied can 
have a significant impact on damages, especially for pre-award 
interest, given the potential length of the arbitration process.1 For 
example, if it takes five years for a claimant to secure an award, a 
10% pre-award interest rate would raise a US$100 million claim by 
60% to US$160 million,2 and the interest would represent 37.5% of 
the total damages awarded. 
This example is not just a hypothetical. In a recent case 
involving Tenaris S.A., a company incorporated in Luxembourg, and 
the country of Venezuela, principal damages amounted to US$87.3 
million, and pre-award interest totaled US$85.5 million, or close to 
50% of the total damages awarded.3 Similarly, in another case 
involving the export of tobacco products and the country of Mexico, 
principal damages totaled Mex$9.5 million, and pre-award interest 
was Mex$7.5 million, or 44% per cent of the total award.4 Finally, in 
 
1. LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Costs and Duration: 2013-2016, 
at 8, https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/LCIA-
Facts-and-Figures-Costs-and-Duration-2013-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP8S-KSJ3] 
(archived May 8, 2018).  
2. This figure assumes that interest is compounded annually. More frequent 
compounding would increase the interest amount even further. 
3. Tenaris S.A. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7098.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4V5-
REPL] (archived May 8, 2018).  
4. James Dow, Interest, in THE GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 
(John A. Trenor ed. 2016). 
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cases ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15 pre-award interest actually 
exceeded the principal amount of damages to which it was applied.5 
Despite their practical importance, interest rates are rarely a 
major focus of parties and tribunals when pleading and granting 
awards. While interest is important from an economic perspective, 
many tribunals give little consideration to this issue.6 As a result, pre-
award interest is an under-pleaded area, and there are significant 
differences in the approaches used by parties and tribunals.7 
Recent research confirms these findings. A study by Professor 
James Dow from the London Business School8 demonstrates that 
tribunals select a variety of interest rates for awards. This includes US 
Treasury bills and London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR),  with 
and without a premium (also known as “spread”).9 
The Dow study also shows that tribunals give diverse 
justifications for the choice of rates.10 In some cases, it appears that 
respondents simply failed to challenge the specific claim for pre-
award interest, so the tribunals adopted the claimants’ requests.11 
Some tribunals have justified the use of risk-free and interbank rates 
as appropriate to compensate claimants; in  other cases, the awards 
refer to specific rates contained in the relevant treaties.12 
 
5. Kardassopoulos & Fuchs v. Republic of Geor., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 & 
ARB/07/15, Award (Mar. 3, 2010). 
6. An Unexpected Interest in Interest, GLOB. ARB. REV. (May 12, 2015), http://
globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034451/an-unexpected-interest-in-interest 
[https://perma.cc/QM2J-2LX3] (archived May 8, 2018). 
7. Id. 
8. Professor Dow is also an academic advisor to The Brattle Group. BRATTLE GRP., 
James Dow, http://www.brattle.com/experts/james-dow [https://perma.cc/29WG-T9W8] 
(archived on Mar. 28, 2018). 
9. See An Unexpected Interest in Interest, supra note 6. The study shows that in 23 of the 
60 cases analyzed, pre-award interest was calculated on the market benchmark plus a premium 
such as, for example LIBOR plus 1% or US Treasury bills (T-bills) plus 2%. In 14 cases, 
Professor Dow found that the tribunal simply stated a rate (such as 4.5% or 9%). In the 
remaining 23 cases, pre-award interest was a base rate, but without any spread. The study also 
showed that the adders or spreads vary significantly across awards. For example, no spread 
was added in 5 of the 21 cases based on LIBOR, 2% was added in 9 cases, 4% in 4 cases and 
1% in 2 cases. In one case the spread was based on “political risk.” Id. 
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) reached similar conclusions in a 
2016 study.13 In 60% of the awards analyzed, the tribunal did not 
explicitly address the reasons behind interest awarded, while the 
explanations for the other 40% were diverse.14 They include the 
application of a contractual and/or statutory rate, or a desire to 
compensate the claimant by offering a rate commensurate with its 
borrowing costs, or by offering a reasonable return on investment.15 
The PwC study also notes that tribunals generally do not distinguish 
between pre- and post-award interest rates.16 When the distinction is 
addressed explicitly, tribunals have expressed very different views.17 
In some cases, tribunals have taken the view that pre- and post-award 
interest should be calculated using the same methodology – while in 
other cases, tribunals have stated that pre- and post-award interest 
should be treated differently.18  
Like Professor Dow, the authors of the  PwC study found that 
tribunals appear to be aware of issues related to the money currency 
of the award.19 This does not mean, however, that tribunals follow a 
unified approach.20 The PwC study notes that some tribunals 
explicitly recognized that the interest rate should match the currency 
of the award, while others felt that this was not necessary.21 
The two aforementioned studies suggest that the economics 
behind the choice of interest rate in awards are not well understood. 
In the next section of this Article, we will propose a principles-based, 
economic framework for choosing the appropriate pre- and post-
award interest rates. This framework can be implemented by 
tribunals, parties, and experts. 
 
13. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Dispute Perspective: Tribunals’ Conflicts on 
Interest (2016), https://www.pwc.co.uk/tax/assets/tribunals-conflicts-on-interest-new.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EUL2-YM7B] (archived May 8, 2018). 
14. See id. 
15. See id.  
16. See id.  
17. See id.  
18. See id.  
19. See id.  
20. See id.  
21. See id.  
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING INTEREST RATES  
The framework we develop to select pre- and post-award interest 
rates reflects economic principles and provides fair compensation. By 
“fair compensation,” we refer to an  interest rate that is market-based, 
that compensates for the risks that the tribunal chooses to recognize, 
and that preserves the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the award. Our 
proposed framework encompasses two fundamental concepts. First, 
the relevant valuation standard is FMV – the rate consistent with 
well-functioning markets for arm’s-length transactions between well 
informed parties. Second, the interest awarded should address two of 
the most basic concepts in finance: the time value of money and the 
risk of the cash flows at issue.22 Our approach is consistent with and 
accomplishes other policy objectives at times cited in the relevant 
literature, including: 1) signaling the social obligation to honor 
contracts, 2) preventing unjust enrichment, and 3) avoiding incentives 
by either side to benefit by delaying payment.23 
To motivate a company to extend a loan, the loan must generate 
a return at least as high as that available on a riskless asset – say a 
guaranteed bank deposit or a US Treasury bill. Such a rate 
compensates for the time value of money during the delay in receipt 
of payment – here, the delay from the date of valuation to the date of 
award. Interest rates must also provide compensation for bearing the 
risk of default by the debtor, and for the risk that interest rates will 
rise during the lending period above the level expected when the debt 
is issued.24 Lenders would not willingly extend credit without such 
compensation, since short-term and risk-free alternatives would be 
superior. All of these factors should be considered in determining the 
appropriate pre- and post-award interest rate. 
 
22. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 21, 24 (10th ed. 2011); RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 48, § 6.1.  
23.  See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 
295-98 (1996). Punishing the wrongdoer is also sometimes listed as a policy objective. Our 
approach does not include a punitive element, but it does establish a  market benchmark, in the 
sense that imposing a higher rate can be seen as including a punitive element. 
24. This latter component, called interest rate risk, arises from variation in the two 
components of nominal interest rates: inflation and the real interest rate. Over the course of a 
long-term loan, both can be higher or lower than expectations held by market participants at 
loan inception. See also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 53-64 (10th ed. 2011) (providing 
an economic discussion of interest rates).   
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A. Prevailing Theories of Pre-Award Interest 
Scholars and practitioners have proposed three main approaches 
to pre-award interest. Each approach implies a different rate. As we 
discuss below, the “forced loan theory” proposes the respondent’s 
cost of borrowing. A second theory advocates for a risk-free rate (the 
“risk-free rate theory”). A third strand of theories proposes some 
measure of the claimant’s cost of financing.25 
The “forced” or “coerced” loan theory argues that the correct 
rate is the respondent’s borrowing rate, in effect treating the claimant 
as a “forced creditor” of the respondent. 26  The key argument under 
this theory is that compensation was due at the date of the breach. 
Since compensation was due, but not paid, at that date, the claimant 
bore the risk of the respondent’s default, just like other creditors who 
may have extended loans on a voluntary commercial basis at the date 
of the breach.27 Under this approach, the respondent effectively owes 
a fixed amount as of the date of the breach, and the failure to pay 
immediate compensation is the equivalent of borrowing money from 
the claimant. The argument is that claimants deserve compensation 
commensurate with other unsecured lenders to the respondent, at the 
respondent’s unsecured borrowing rate.28 
An alternative theory argues that courts and arbitration tribunals 
should apply the risk-free rate (the “risk-free rate” theory) since there 
is no risk of default at the time the award is issued.29 The key contrast 
with the forced loan theory is that here proponents view the liability 
 
25. See INGMAR MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW § 6.B.1, Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3, & 
Appendix 4 (2d ed. 2017) (listing interest rates for ICSID cases, NAFTA cases, Energy 
Charter cases, and ad hoc deliberations, respectively). 
26. See Roy J. Epstein, Prejudgment Interest Rates in Patent Cases: Don’t Compound an 
Error, 24 (2) IPL. Newsl. (2006), at 9.   
27.  James M. Patell, Roman L. Weil & Mark A. Wolfson, Accumulating Damages in 
Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 343 (1982).  
28. Jeffrey M. Colón & Michael S. Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, in  LITIGATION 
SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT § 16.4 (Roman L. Weil et al., 
eds., 6th ed., 2017). See also Robert L. Losey, Michael Mass & Jingsan Li, Prejudgment 
Interest: The Long and the Short of It, 15 J. FORENSIC ECON. 59 (2002); Jeffrey M. Colón & 
Michael S. Knoll, Prejudgment Interest in International Arbitration (2007); Faculty 
Scholarship Paper 185, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/185 
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4035-34625-40301-40679] (archived May 8, 2018). 
29.  See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and the Theory 
of Damages, 5 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 145 (1990). 
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as arising at the moment of the award, at which time the respondent 
presumably is not in default on its general commercial obligations.30 
To the extent that claimant has been exposed to risks between the 
breach and award dates, the risk-free rate theory categorizes them as 
general litigation risks, rather than financial risks that arose at the date 
of breach.31 Proponents of the theory have appealed to two aspects of 
the US legal system: the presumption of innocence prior to verdict, 
and the general rule that each side bears its own legal costs.32 Under 
this theory, then, the risk that a respondent fails financially prior to an 
award is viewed as a litigation risk rather than a financial risk. For 
example: 
The risk of the defendant’s bankruptcy is not the only risk the 
plaintiff bears. It also bears the risk of losing the case . . . . [T]he 
risk that the defendant will go bankrupt during trial is properly 
associated with the risks of litigation, not with the violation itself. 
It is hard to see why that risk should be singled out as one for 
which the plaintiff is to be compensated. Accordingly, we retain 
the position that prejudgment interest should be awarded at the 
risk-free rate.33 
Under this view, awarding any higher rate would constitute an 
abuse of hindsight, in effect compensating the claimant for an 
investment that was never undertaken. That is, given that the 
respondent is solvent at the time of the award and that it did not owe a 
debt to the claimant before then, the claimant should not be entitled to 
a premium for past default risk that it did not bear.34 The theory is 
economically coherent, but if the tribunal viewed the debt as arising at 
the time of the breach itself, as opposed to the date of the award, the 
conclusions would be reversed.  
Moreover, a tribunal could still endorse the forced loan theory 
while accepting the view of pre-award interest as part of the category 
of general legal expenses. Some jurisdictions differ markedly from 
the US system, and award litigation expenses to claimants who 
prevail. Claimants could argue that the forced loan theory accurately 
 
30. See, e.g., id.  
31. See id. at 147-148. 
32. Id.  
33. Id. at 147-48 (discussing the issue within the context of the US legal system). 
34. See id. at 146. 
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reflects a cost that they bore in connection with the protracted nature 
of the dispute. 
It is worth emphasizing that, while the forced loan theory uses 
the word “forced,” it does not include a punitive element in the pre-
award interest rate. The forced loan theory implies a fair market rate, 
reflecting the FMV principle, i.e., the rate at which lenders would 
agree to lend to the respondent in arm’s-length commercial 
transactions. We are aware of one case in which the tribunal rejected 
the forced loan theory because it associated the word “forced” with a 
desire to punish the respondent, even though the tribunal viewed 
prejudgment interest as an instrument to compensate the claimant for 
the postponement of compensation that had become due many years 
in the past. The tribunal was also willing to compensate the claimant 
for litigation expenses, so there was no appeal to the notion that 
litigants should bear their own costs. The relevant legal framework 
called for a commercial rate, and the tribunal thought that responding 
to an image of a loan as “forced” would stray from the requirement to 
rely on normal commercial terms. However, the word “forced” was, 
in that case, just an unfortunate term for a principle that directly 
appealed to rates set in the market by willing lenders and the 
respondent. 
We conclude that the same basic principle applies to both the 
forced loan and the risk-free rate theories. That is, that pre-award 
interest should reflect risk at the market rate. The difference between 
them lies in the tribunal’s approach to the prior risk of financial 
insolvency or default of the respondent.35 
A separate strand of theories views pre-award interest as an issue 
related to the claimant’s cost of funds.36 The argument is frequently 
made along the lines best illustrated with a simple hypothetical 
example: the claimant borrowed from a bank to finance the purchase 
price of an asset that was expropriated shortly afterwards. In the 
absence of the expropriation, the loan would have carried an interest 
rate commensurate with the risk of the underlying asset. If the 
 
35. We note that there is no tension between the requirement in some treaties or 
contracts for the use of a “commercial” rate of interest and the use of a risk-free rate. The risk-
free rate is itself a commercial rate for securities without default risk. It is set in free markets 
by commercial parties and investors transacting freely. In other words, it defines the 
commercial rate for lending and borrowing risk-free amounts. 
36. MARBOE, supra note 26, § 6.B.1. 
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claimant did not repay the bank immediately upon expropriation, the 
loan would have continued to accrue interest until the receipt of 
compensation from the respondent. If the respondent’s borrowing rate 
is lower than the interest rate on the underlying asset loan, then the 
argument is that either a risk-free rate or the forced loan theory would 
impose a loss upon the claimant, failing to cover the loan costs prior 
to the award. 
A different, but related, argument is that claimants had to borrow 
to replace the lost funds in order to make profitable investments. 
Claimants, at times, argue that pre-award interest should cover the 
interest paid on incremental sums that they borrowed in the absence 
of prompt compensation from the respondent. The argument here is 
that the claimants would have borrowed less in the absence of the 
disputed conduct. A generalized form of the argument considers not 
just the loans undertaken by the claimant, but also the cost of raising 
equity funds, which together combine to form the claimant’s overall 
cost of capital (or weighted average cost of capital—WACC). The 
argument is then that the principle of full compensation or full 
reparation requires the calculation of pre-award interest based on the 
claimant’s cost of capital,37 to put the claimant in the position it 
would have achieved absent the breach.38 
We explain below why a uniform appeal to the claimant’s cost 
of borrowing or its cost of capital is not consistent with economic 
principles. We also explain why the arguments advanced by 
proponents of this approach may reflect case-specific circumstances 
rather than general principles. Our view is that a tribunal could 
address such circumstances directly as a distinct element of damages, 
as opposed to indirectly through the pre-award interest rate. 
B. Implementation of the Framework for Pre-Award Interest 
Our framework consists of four steps, guided by the principle 
that matching risk to return should inform the specific choice of rate. 
 
37. The principle of full compensation or full reparation is to “wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act” and it is usually referred to as the Chorzów Standard.  See 
Germ. v. Pol., PCIJ Case No. 17 (Sept. 13, 1928),  http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/
decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm [https://perma.cc/4WTJ-MGLJ] (archived May 8, 2018).  
38. See, e.g., Manuel A. Abdala, Pablo D. López Zadicoff & Pablo T. Spiller, Invalid 
Round Trips in Setting Pre-Judgment Interest in International Arbitration, 5 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REV. 1 (2011). 
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Our approach follows the FMV standard in that the selected rate 
would be consistent with well-functioning markets for arm’s-length 
transactions between well informed parties, subject to the risks that 
are deemed legally compensable.  
Figure 1 summarizes the steps: 
 
Figure 1: Steps to Determine Pre-Award Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Step # 1: Allocate Default Risk 
First, the tribunal decides if the risk of the respondent’s default 
prior to an award is relevant and compensable to the claimant. If it is 
not, then the pre-award interest should be calculated at the risk-free 
rate. This would be consistent with the risk-free rate theory that there 
was no debt until the award was issued, at which point there is no 
chance of past default if the respondent is present and solvent. Here, 
then, the only compensation needed for the claimant is the time value 
of money between the date of valuation and the date of the award.  
If the tribunal decides that the claimant deserves compensation 
for the risk of the respondent’s default prior to an award, then pre-
award interest should reflect the respondent’s borrowing rate for 
liabilities of the same risk. Using the respondent’s borrowing rate is 
consistent with the forced loan theory discussed above.39 Proponents 
of this theory argue that while we cannot possibly know how the 
proceeds would have been invested if the plaintiff had received them 
earlier, we do not know how they were actually invested, because 
 
39. It may seem counterintuitive that the claimant should be compensated for having 
borne the default risk - even though at the award date, it is known that the respondent is not 
insolvent. It is, however, no different from any lending arrangement in which the loan rate 
reflects borrower’s default risk and the borrower pays that rate, even though it never defaults. 
The risk premium is the compensation necessary to induce the lender to loan in the first place. 
Without it, a willing transaction would not occur.  
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they were advanced to the defendant in the form of a forced loan. 40 
Thus, to award less than the respondent’s borrowing rate would fail to 
compensate the claimant for risks it was indeed forced to bear. 
Conversely, to award more would compensate a claimant for greater 
risks than it was forced to bear. 
Awarding pre-award interest at the respondent’s borrowing rate 
does not imply straying from a focus on the claimant and how it was 
affected by the delay.41 If payment became due on the date of the 
breach, then the payment delay caused the claimant to bear the 
respondent’s risk of default. Awarding interest at a rate commensurate 
with the risk provides fair market compensation for the effect on 
claimant’s financial position. It also prevents unjust enrichment of the 
respondent, as commentators have noted,42 but that is not its only 
economic result. 
Using either the risk-free rate or the respondent’s borrowing rate 
would be consistent with the principles of market-based rates of 
addressing the risks deemed legally compensable and preserving 
FMV across time. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. 
Suppose that a tribunal has ruled in favor of the claimant on the 
breach/valuation date, and granted it an award worth US$100 on that 
date (i.e., assuming an instantaneous ruling from the tribunal). 
Suppose that the tribunal orders the respondent to offer two 
alternatives for payment: (1) immediately hand over a two-year US 
Treasury security with a face value (or principal amount) of US$100 
that pays a risk-free market rate of 3% per year43 or (2) a promissory 
note issued by the respondent for the same US$100 in principal 
amount with an interest rate of 5%, maturing in two years’ time. 
Assume further that the higher rate of 5% is the market interest rate 
applicable on the respondent’s other debt, and compensates for the 
chance that the respondent might default before maturity of the debt. 
The FMV of either alternative on the valuation date is US$100, 
and would represent full compensation if given at the date of breach, 
 
40. See Knoll, supra note 24, at 310-11. 
41. See MARBOE, supra note 26, ¶¶ 6.110-111.  
42. Id. ¶ 6.111; see also Knoll, supra note 24, at 310-11 (explaining that in the  generic 
commercial litigation context, the defendant’s borrowing rate both compensates the plaintiff 
and prevents the unjust enrichment of the defendant). 
43. For simplicity, we assume that this US Treasury security is trading at par (i.e., at its 
face value of US$100), on the valuation date. 
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just as payment of US$100 in cash would. To see this, consider that in 
principle, the claimant could sell the two-year US Treasury security to 
a third party for the US$100 amount of the award. It could also sell 
the respondent’s two-year promissory note for the same amount. 
Potential purchasers would value the note just like any other future 
payments owed by the respondent. 
Of course, in practice tribunals do not rule instantaneously; it 
takes time to secure an award. Thus, in reality, the tribunal has to 
decide whether to compensate the claimant for the risk of default 
between the date of breach and the date of the award. If the tribunal 
decides that it should not, then the tribunal should award interest 
based on a risk-free rate, otherwise it is appropriate to apply the 
respondent’s borrowing rate. In either case the selected rate 
compensates the claimant for the risks that the tribunal chooses to 
recognize. In this illustration, the 3% in the US Treasury44 
compensates solely for the time value of money, while the 5% in the 
promissory note compensates as well for the risk of the respondent’s 
default.45 
2. Step # 2: Ensure that Interest Rate Matches Currency of the 
Award 
Tribunals should ensure that the interest rate matches the 
currency of the award. Interest rates reflect inflation and exchange 
rate expectations that are currency-specific. Therefore, the rate used 
should be based on market rates in the currency in which the award is 
denominated,46 as it is not economically meaningful to apply rates 
quoted in one currency to amounts denominated in a different 
currency.47 
 
44. Again, assuming the US government’s risk of default is zero, the 3% compensates 
the claimant for the time value of money. 
45. We abstracted in this example from issues related to interest rate risk, which are 
addressed in § II.B.2 of the framework. 
46. Note that the award thus calculated can then be paid in any freely traded currency 
using the market exchange rate at the time of payment. 
47. See Colón & Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, supra note 30, at 18-21 (providing a 
detailed discussion of currency conversion in the context of pre-award interest, as well as the 
need for matching the interest rate to the award currency). See also Dow, supra note 4 (noting 
that arbitration tribunals are generally aware of the issue and choose the currency of interest 
rates appropriately). See generally MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION: 
COMPENSATION STANDARDS, VALUATION METHODS, AND EXPERT EVIDENCE § 9.2 (2008).   
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However, matching the interest rate currency with the award 
currency does not make the choice of the award currency itself 
irrelevant. An award calculated in US dollars that carries a US dollar 
interest would not, in general, result in  the same amount at the time 
of payment as if it were calculated in, say, euros (carrying a  euro 
interest rate) and then converted to US dollars. The choice of the 
award currency is important, but it is a separate question from pre-
award interest.48 
3. Step # 3: Select Rate Based on Maturity Consistent with Relevant 
Risks 
The next step is for the tribunal to select the benchmark rate 
consistent with its allocation of risk,49 while taking into account 
maturity and length of compensation. Markets generally require 
higher rates for lending or borrowing over a longer period of time. 
Again, reflecting a core principle of finance, higher rates for longer 
maturities compensate lenders or investors for bearing risks arising 
from the irreversible commitment of funds. For fixed-rate debt, 
lenders bear risks that include unexpected changes in inflation, real 
interest rates, and borrower’s default risk.50 
It may seem natural to set pre-award interest using long-term 
rates, reflecting the time elapsed between breach and award dates, in 
order to provide compensation for these risks. If the selected long-
term rate is commensurate with market rates, such selection would 
compensate the claimant for these risks, but it would also force the 
claimant to bear them. Perhaps we could all agree that a five-year 
fixed interest rate at the time of the breach would prove too low and 
“out-of-market” by the end of the fifth year (assuming that it takes 
five years to receive an award) if  either inflation or real interest rates 
increased shortly after the breach, or the respondent’s solvency 
deteriorates. In other words, a fixed long-term rate is not consistent 
 
48. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW § 10.1 (2008) (providing legal considerations regarding the choice of 
currency for awards in investment arbitration).  
49. That is, the risk-free rate or respondent’s borrowing rate. 
50. Long-term rates can be higher than short-term rates also because investors expect 
short-term interest rates to rise over time. However, that alone cannot explain why long-term 
rates are much more frequently above short-term rates than below. See BREALEY ET AL., supra 
note 25, at 58. 
834 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:821 
with the risk-free rate approach, because long-term rates, even on 
instruments with no default risk, are not truly risk-free, due to interest 
rate risk exposure. Simply using the rate for a security at the time of 
the breach whose maturity matches the award date compensates the 
claimant based on market expectations and risk preferences at the 
time of the breach, but leaves that claimant exposed to potential gains 
or losses from changing circumstances. 
An alternative view is that the tribunal should apply a series of 
rolling short-term rates to protect the claimant from the risks of 
fluctuations in inflation, real interest rates, and of changes in 
respondent’s default risk that may have occurred after the date of 
breach,51 if default risk is deemed compensable in Step 1. Exposure to 
interest rate risk is not inherently part of the forced nature of the loan. 
This is because if the claimant and the respondent negotiated an 
arm’s-length loan at the date of the breach, claimant could avoid 
interest rate risk exposure by structuring the loan with a floating rate 
that tracks changes in short-term interest rates.52 
The potential disadvantage of using rolling short-term rates is 
that it does not address the long-term commitment of funds. A 
claimant could in principle still claim that it deserves a premium to 
address the commitment of funds over an extended period of years. 
Rolling short-term rates forward over time offers certain types of 
protection, but it does not address illiquidity risk, which cannot be 
avoided if the claimant is unable to sell or borrow against an eventual 
award when it faces an unexpected need for cash. Such a premium, 
however, would be small because commercial entities not in financial 
distress, which are often the claimants in international arbitration 
cases, have access to financial markets that allow them to meet 
unexpected liquidity needs. As we discuss in Step 4 below, if special 
circumstances cause a claimant to suffer harm from being unable to 
access funds, such harm can be calculated and awarded separately as 
damages. A related, but distinct liquidity premium for long-term 
commitments can arise if short-term rates do not fully reflect the risk 
 
51. Note that to eliminate exposure to changes in respondent’s default risk, the premium 
for default risk should be time-varying. In practice, the credit default spread (CDS) market can 
provide timely information about changes in default risk. See Knoll, supra note 24, at 324-26 
(proposing the alternative of a floating base rate plus a fixed default risk premium, which locks 
in the expected risk of respondent’s default at the time of the breach.   
52. See id. 
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of default on a long-term loan because of lack of liquidity as a 
borrower approaches insolvency and default.53 
Applying a rolling short-term rate can result in either a higher or 
a lower cumulative interest amount, as opposed to applying the long-
term rate over the same period.54 Both approaches appeal to 
underlying principles and match risk and return, but it is clear that the 
claimant or respondent may prefer one or the other knowing in 
hindsight which approach is most advantageous. The appropriate 
answer depends on the risks that claimant is forced to bear and that 
the tribunal believes it should recognize. Rolling short-term rates can 
insulate the claimants from the risk of subsequent spikes in rates, but 
does not provide compensation for forgoing access to the funds for a 
long period. A tribunal can compensate the claimant for this lack of 
liquidity by adopting a fixed, long-term interest rate at the date of 
breach, but such an approach exposes the claimant to the risk of 
subsequent movements in interest rates, including changes in 
respondent’s default risk under the forced loan theory. 
If default risk is deemed compensable, a practical solution may 
involve using a rolling short-term risk-free rate, such as the Treasury 
bill rate for US dollars amounts and add a credit risk premium 
measured based on market instruments. These could include credit 
default swaps or bonds, with a longer maturity. This would, in effect, 
provide a premium that can compensate for illiquidity effects arising 
from the long-term nature of the commitment, while still protecting 
the claimant from risk of changes in interest rates and likelihood of 
default. 
If the tribunal has determined that interest should be based on 
the respondent’s borrowing rate, it should also consider whether 
 
53. That is, in theory, as a borrower’s solvency deteriorates, the rate at which it can 
borrow would increase, but in practice, lenders may simply be unwilling to lend at some point. 
A lender who lends on a rolling short-term basis is less exposed to this risk because it can 
simply not roll over the debt as the borrower’s solvency deteriorates. 
54. The long-term rate at the start of the loan reflects market expectation of the evolution 
of short-term interest rates over the course of the loan. This happens because for market 
participants to lend freely at the long-term rate, they should be indifferent between extending a 
loan at a fixed, long-term rate and extending a series of short-term loans. Therefore, if short-
term rates rise above the levels expected at inception, a floating-rate loan would accumulate 
more interest than the fixed-rate loan, and vice versa if short-term rates rise fall below 
expected levels. However, because long-term rates incorporate a premium for bearing interest 
rate risk (as discussed above), on average awarding interest at long-term rates results in higher 
pre-award interest than applying short-term rates. 
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awards have favorable or unfavorable credit characteristics relative to 
the benchmark chosen. These differences are likely to be relatively 
small. Examples include differences in priority or costs of 
enforcement or collection. 
4. Step # 4: Address Claims of Additional Harm Caused by Delay in 
Payment 
As a final step, tribunals should address any claims for 
additional damages suffered based on the claimant’s cost of financing, 
be it the cost of debt, the cost of equity, or the cost of capital. The 
claimant may argue that the inability to access the award amount at 
the date of the breach: 1) has caused the claimant to raise financing at 
some cost that would not have been incurred if the funds had been 
made immediately available, or 2), has prevented the claimant from 
pursuing profitable investment opportunities, or 3) has prevented the 
claimant from repaying outstanding loans taken to finance the asset 
that was expropriated or impaired by respondent’s breach. As general 
theories of pre-award interest, such arguments are inconsistent with 
economic principles of compensation. In specific circumstances, the 
arguments may be economically sensible and the tribunal can address 
the specific facts separately and make a decision based on evidence 
that links those facts to specific harm to the claimant. 
The claim that the respondent’s actions left the claimant without 
the cash necessary to fund attractive investments, so instead the 
claimant borrowed and paid a relatively high interest rate on loans, 
does not satisfy the basic principle of aligning risk and return. If the 
claimant had a higher borrowing cost than the respondent, and 
borrowed at that higher cost to finance its operations/investments, 
then the operations/investments must have had a higher risk than the 
amounts owed by the respondent. It does not mean that the claimant 
has paid too much in interest. 
In other words, funds always have a cost. It is mistaken to argue 
that the prompt payment of compensation from the respondent would 
have deprived the claimant of the need to incur a cost of funds. If the 
respondent had harmed the claimant by US$100, and had immediately 
reimbursed the claimant with a payment of US$100 on the date of 
breach, then the US$100 would still have had its own implicit cost of 
funds before the claimant redirected it to the alleged attractive 
investment. The cost of funds associated with the hypothetical 
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US$100 cash compensation should have been the same as on any 
external loan that the claimant actually undertook. 
A similar, related argument made by the claimants is that the 
respondent’s actions prevented the claimant from obtaining a return 
on the investment, so that pre-award interest should be calculated at 
the project’s cost of capital for the award to put the claimant in the 
position they would have achieved absent the breach.55 The problem 
with this logic is readily apparent when considering the principle of 
aligning risk and return. The cost of capital represents the expected 
rate an investor earns in exchange for bearing the risk of earning 
more or less than a particular target, including the possibility of 
actually experiencing a loss. The cost of capital is by no means a 
certain return.56 Awarding such a return is inappropriate if the alleged 
violation has itself deprived the claimant of the risk associated with 
an asset or business.57 
Suppose that the respondent has expropriated an asset worth 
US$100 on the valuation date, and that the cost of capital for that 
asset would have been 15%. Suppose that the pre-award interest 
covers one year so that a claim for the cost of capital would bring the 
value of the award to US$115 in one year.58 If the expropriation has 
deprived the claimant of the risk associated with the asset, then it 
would be inappropriate to award the claimant the 15% return, which 
includes compensation for risk not borne. If we know with certainty 
that the respondent would never default, then an investor would use a 
risk-free rate to estimate the fair market value of an award of US$115 
in one year. If the risk-free rate is only 4%, then the FMV of the 
award would be US$110.60 as of the date of valuation.59 Losing 
US$100 in FMV, the claimant would in effect receive an award with 
an FMV that is US$10.60 higher. One can conclude that awarding the 
cost of capital does not respect the principle of FMV in this case. 
 
55. See, e.g., Abdala et al., supra note 40. 
56. To illustrate this point, suppose that an investor makes such a risky investment 
multiple times. On average, the return would be the cost of capital, but in each individual case, 
the return could be higher than the average, sometimes it would be below the average, and in 
some instances the investor would actually experience a loss. 
57. See, e.g., Aaron Dolgoff & Tiago Duarte-Silva, Prejudgment Interest and the Fallacy 
of the Invalid Round Trip, 10 World Arb. & Mediation Rev. 429 (2016).  
58. $100 ൈ 1.15 ൌ $115. 
59. $115/1.04 ൌ $110.6. 
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Commentators have noted a pernicious element to applying the 
cost of capital, in that high-risk assets would receive larger amounts 
of pre-award interest even if the breach prevented the claimant from 
incurring any further business risk in connection with the asset.60 
Applying the cost of capital indirectly re-inserts into the equation a 
risk of loss that the breach actually removed.61 The same principle 
implies that it is inappropriate to award pre-award interest based on 
the expected return on other investments that the claimant has not 
made, such as the overall stock market: it would provide 
compensation for a risk that claimant has not borne.62 An ex-post 
compensation standard explicitly rewards the claimant for the 
resolution of risk that the claimant did not actually bear after the date 
of breach, yet tribunals often hesitate to impose such a standard unless 
they make specific findings of a willful or flagrant violation. 
Moreover, if the claimant had a lucrative investment 
opportunity, it should have been able to finance it at whatever market 
rate was appropriate for the risk of that investment. As long as the 
claimant had access to funding sources, which is the typical case for a 
commercial entity, the delay in receiving compensation should not 
have prevented it from undertaking attractive investments, and 
therefore should not have caused any harm. In special cases when the 
claimant could not access external financing, the claimant could bring 
evidence of specific investment opportunities that it would have 
pursued but for the lack of financing. If the tribunal found the 
evidence sufficient to support a claim for damages under the relevant 
legal standards, the tribunal could grant an award for the proven loss 
of opportunity. 
The third argument for using the claimant’s cost of funds – that 
the expropriation denied the claimant the funds to repay an 
outstanding loan taken to finance the asset that was expropriated or 
impaired by the respondent’s breach – has its own problems. First, it 
assumes that the claimant cannot have repaid or refinanced the loan 
 
60. See Dolgoff & Duarte-Silva, supra note 62, at 443. 
61. See William B. Tye, Stephen H Kalos, & A. Lawrence Kolbe, How to Value a Lost 
Opportunity: Defining and Measuring Damages from Market Foreclosure,  17 Res. in L. & 
Econ. 83 (1995) (providing a discussion of related economic arguments).  
62. See Thierry J. Sénéchal & John Y. Gotanda, Interest as Damages, 47 Colum J. 
Transnat’l L. 491 (2009) (describing a proposal to award an interest rate that includes the 
expected return on the overall stock market).  
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once the asset was lost. But if that is the case, then the claimant 
should be able to identify and measure the additional cost, 
demonstrate that it could not have been avoided through mitigation, 
and claim it directly as an additional element of damages. The 
associated costs would form part of the damages to which a tribunal 
should apply pre-award interest. Second, it assumes that the 
respondent’s borrowing rate is lower than the interest rate on the 
underlying loan on the asset so that the respondent’s borrowing rate 
would fail to cover the loan costs prior to the award. 
In summary, arguments based on the claimant’s cost of financing 
generally do not hold  because the typical claimant has access to well-
functioning financial markets.63 It can therefore fund investment 
opportunities on FMV terms, neither foregoing potentially profitable 
investments nor paying above-market financing costs to fund them. 
However, some claimants may lack access to markets, or market 
frictions may make external funding more expensive than their own 
funds. Resulting losses may be compensable under such specific 
circumstances and the tribunal can evaluate the factual evidence and 
determine whether it meets the legal standard necessary to award 
damages. Such an inquiry is similar to that conducted to award other 
types of damages. 
C. Post-Award Interest 
Post-award interest does not confront the question of the 
allocation of litigation risk. Once the award is established, the 
claimant is formally a creditor to the respondent and should receive a 
rate of interest commensurate with the post-award risks. The starting 
point should be the respondent’s borrowing rate. The tribunal, 
however, should consider making the adjustments we outlined earlier 
to reflect substantive differences, if any, in the risk of default or the 
cost of enforcement of an award compared to those reflected in the 
respondent’s benchmark borrowing rate. In doing so, the post-award 
interest preserves the FMV of the award over time and captures the 
risks of collection. It would also remove incentives for the respondent 
to delay payment and use the award debt as a source of cheap 
financing. 
 
63. See Colón & Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, supra note 30, at 4-6 (providing a 
summary of economic arguments against rates based on claimant’s cost of funds).  
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III. CONCLUSION 
We propose a framework based on economic principles that 
tribunals and experts can apply to determine the correct rates for pre- 
and post- award interest. We propose that a generally applicable pre-
award interest rate is either the risk-free rate or a rate that reflects the 
respondent’s risk of default, with the choice depending on whether 
the tribunal establishes that liability begins at the date of the award or 
at the date of the breach respectively. In either alternative, the 
appropriate economic standard is fair market value and the 
appropriate rate should reflect the time value of money and the risks 
that the tribunal deems compensable. Post-award interest accrues after 
liability is established, and therefore only a rate that reflects 
respondent’s risk of default is relevant. Where specific circumstances 
affect the claimant’s financial position or the markets in which it can 
obtain financing, our framework suggests that the claimant should 
provide evidence of such additional harm.  The tribunal can then 
evaluate that evidence as a separate head of damages. Our framework 
identifies economically principled choices and provides economic 
guidance for tribunals’ interpretation of the economic aspects of the 
contract, treaty, or law at issue. 
